

# **The position of the United Nations on sectarian violence after the bombing of the shrine of the Imams Al-Askari in 2006**

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## **Summary**

*The American war in Iraq and the downfall of the past regime in 2003 created a political and security vacuum that resulted in the emergence of sectarian violence in Iraq. Those affected by the new political system, particularly the Baathist's and extremist groups, played a role in felling and increasing sectarian violence. Their malicious schemes resulted in the bombing of the shrine of the Imams Al-Askari (pbuh) year 2006, which caused the appearance of killings on the basis of sectarian identity and the targeting of mosques, husseiniyyat and churches. The United Nations took a firm stance on sectarian violence, conducted a set of procedures. In order to pay all Iraqi parties dialogue and to eschew violence.*

## **Keywords**

The political and security situation in Iraq, The bombing of the shrine of the Imams Al-Askari (pbuh), and The international and regional position him to, the United Nations position on sectarian violence.



### **Introduction**

The uniqueness of the United States of America using force against the former Iraqi regime and its overthrow in 2003 without international consensus, a turning point in Iraq's history, where Iraq has witnessed a political and security vacuum, as well as the destruction of its economic buildings. That situation has adversely contributed to the creation of suitable ground for Ba 'atheist and extremist political opposition groups in armed attacks against military personnel and civilians in Iraq; political process.

The bombing of the shrine of the Imams Al-Askari in 2006 was the most serious and sensitive circle of sectarian violence due to the sensitivity of this religious symbol, which is respected by the Iraqi people and highly sacred by the Shia community. The bombing adversely affected the peaceful coexistence of Iraqis and caused reprisals on the basis of the sectarian identity; Targeting mosques, husseiniyyat and churches and targeting Arab residents in Iraq and the international and regional community has condemned this bombing with official and popular statements and statements, The United Nations, through its Secretary-General and its mission in Iraq, has attempted to hold intensive consultations with various Iraqi leaders with different religious, clan and political party affiliations to reduce sectarian violence and persuade them to resort to dialogue and absorb popular anger in Iraq.

Given the importance of this research and its association with the peaceful coexistence of Iraqis and its repercussions on Iraq's regional surroundings, this researcher was motivated to address it with research and analysis, especially as he had not studied any historical academic study, the aim of which was to focus on the United Nations position on sectarian violence and the solutions and actions it had put forward to reduce it.

This study consisted of an introduction, three axes and a conclusion, in which the researcher dealt with the United Nations position on sectarian violence and the circumstances that caused the emergence of sectarian violence, and how the United Nations dealt with it, the solutions and procedures it had to reduce it.

### **First Axis/Political and Security Conditions Prepared for the Bombing of the the Al-Askari shrine (peace be upon them).**

The year 2006 was one of the most elaborate years in the history of the Iraqi people. It included sad events that affected it, Perhaps the most important of them was the bombing of the shrine of the Imams Al-Askari incident on 22 February 2006, and the subsequent clashes, killings and displacement in both Shia and Sunni areas, not the secret that Imam Ali bin Mohammed al-Hadi (p) (1). Imam Al-Hassan Ben Ali Al-Askari (p) <sup>(2)</sup> is a Muslim imam and holds a special place for them, especially in the Shia community, which believes in their resurrection and is one of the twelve pillars before them. Religious symbolism has made this event take on political and societal dimensions.

In fact, the United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) recognized the seriousness of this terrorist bombing and tried to play a role in containing its implications for the political process and for Iraqi society by encouraging the renunciation of sectarian violence and advocating unity among Iraqis, as well as contributing to the operations of its the Holy Shrine of Al-Askariyain (P) (3).



The bombing of the contractors was the result of Iraq's political circumstances following the referendum on the Constitution. and the resulting holding of Iraq's first constitutional elections on 15 December 2005, Electoral lists such as Sunni, Shi 'a, Kurd and Iraqi minorities participated. Although Sunni Arabs gained more seats than in previous elections, However, it objected to the credibility of the elections and submitted complaints to the High Electoral Commission and demanded an international investigation into the fraud of ballot papers that called for intervention by the United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) in cooperation with the High Electoral Commission, from which it formed a team and staff from the League of Arab States to investigate appeals in elections during the period of time (1-18 Kanon II 2006) and came out with the result that the elections met international standards, so the High Electoral Commission announced its final result in 10 2006 <sup>(4)</sup>, where the list of the unified Iraqi coalition won by 128 seats, the Kurdistan Alliance's list of 53 seats, while Sunni Arabs participated after a long break in the elections with a list (Iraqi Consensus) <sup>(5)</sup>, as well as the National Front for National Dialogue (FNDR) list with 11 seats and the Iraqi National List headed by Ayad Allawi (25) seats, Kurdistan Islamic Union (5) seats, reconciliation and liberation bloc (3) seats, and lists of Yazidi and Turkmen minorities each received one seat <sup>(6)</sup>. The United Nations' involvement of staff from the Arab League appears to be an attempt to reassure Sunni Arabs, who trust the Arab League more than the Iraqi High Electoral Commission, and to grant the elections admissibility to Arab States.

The post-election phase was a difficult one as political difference began to emerge. The selection of the candidate for the formation of the Iraqi government has become the subject of debate and intense disagreement between the Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni forces over the character of Ibrahim Ja 'afari, who was the subject of controversy, especially the Kurds who opposed the renewal of his mandate. The latter had positions in opposition to Kurd<sup>(7)</sup>, as well as the desire of all political leaders, including Sunni Arabs, to participate in political decision-making rather than in accordance with the parliamentary majority. In fact, these differences contributed to delaying the formation of the Government, and allowed for international interventions to intervene in its formation<sup>(8)</sup>.

Iraq's volatile political situation and continued security deterioration <sup>(9)</sup>, Contributed to the increase in terrorist operations and the spread of armed manifestations in Iraqi cities As a result, the targeting of Iraqi civilians and security personnel as well as houses of worship from churches, mosques, Hasaniyat and in a national statistic reported that in December 2005 the number of bodies at the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Baghdad reached 787 <sup>(10)</sup>.

### **The second axis / the bombing of the shrine of the Imams Al-Askari and the international and regional position**

Under these circumstances, the bombing occurred in 22 February 2006, which was a shock to Iraqi society and a precedent in its contemporary history. And there was an emotional reaction and public anger that left its repercussions on Iraq locally, regionally and internationally, This bombing occurred on the morning of Wednesday 23 campus 1427 AH corresponding to 22 February 2006 The shrine broke into people dressed in inner commando uniforms, documented the patrol guard, and mined the underneath the Golden Dome with two explosive devices <sup>(11)</sup> TNT <sup>(12)</sup> weigh (215 kg) of ground-based rocket fillings from the previous Iraqi regime's warehouses. The blast took ten hours to complete, and they used



transmitters and timers to detonate, they made holes in the walls of the shrine, and the golden dome above the shrine was the largest golden dome at the time. (20) m, Qatar (25.20) m contains (70) thousand pieces of gold. According to the crime, the blast was intended to settle the lump with land, But God's will failed this scheme and damage was limited to the dome of the shrine, which was damaged by 70% (13), the Iraqi Government, in the words of National Security Adviser Mufaq al-Rabae (14), accused al-Qa'idah of standing behind the terrorist operation and arrested seven Iraqi and four Saudi and Tunisian individuals (15), the investigations carried out by the Iraqi Government were confirmed, as stated by Minister of the Interior Baqer Saulagh Zubaidi (16), who visited the site of the explosion on the same day confirmed that some Service of the Holy Shrine of al-Askariyain (p) They cooperated with the terrorists and closed the shrine on the night of 22 officers until the morning of visitors to help the terrorists to complete the booby-trapping of the place <sup>(17)</sup>. In fact, it is the responsibility of the Sunni Moratorium who administered the frontline and rejected any attempts to transform it into the Shia moratorium <sup>(18)</sup>.

The incident was condemned internationally, regionally, locally and internationally The United Nations condemned the crime, denouncing United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and appealing to all communities of the Iraqi people to observe the utmost restraint in the face of such provocative acts, He also called on Iraq's political and religious leaders to calm the situation. And to ensure protection and respect for places of worship, while Description of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq Ashraf Jehangir Qazi Ma'qal as The Security Council, in a press release on 22 June 2006, condemned an attempt to provoke sectarianism among Iraqis, called for calm and restraint, urged Iraqi leaders to expedite the formation of the Iraqi government, and also condemned White House spokesman Scott McMillan. The White House(Scott McMillan) spokesman also condemned the incident as evidence that terrorists did not differentiate communities in their actions, while US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzadeh, along with General George W. Casey, described the incident. <sup>(21)</sup> The commander of the multinational forces in Iraq, as a crime against humanity, and that the United States of America will participate in the reconstruction of the two shrines <sup>(22)</sup> The British Government condemned the bombing and promised it shameful action to provoke sectarianism, and the French Foreign Office issued a statement denouncing the incident, calling for unity between Iraqis and condemned by the Governments of Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon. <sup>(23)</sup> As well as Syria, the Emirates, Egypt and other Arab Governments, Arab Islamic figures denounced by the Secretary-General of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Mahdi Akaf <sup>(24)</sup> Al-Khamenei <sup>(25)</sup> described the incident as a political crime and accused the occupation authorities and Israel of orchestrating it. The President of the Republic, Jalal Talabani, and the Head of Government, Ibrahim Ja'afari, and the National Security Adviser, Mufaq al-Rabi'i, condemned the internal positions. Mr. Abdelaziz al-Hakim, as well as Adnan al-Dalimi, condemned the crime <sup>(26)</sup>, Mr. Ali Al-Sistani issued a statement on the occasion condemning the incident, calling for seven days to be mourned and peacefully demonstrated in denunciation of the crime, the Government's responsibility and, in case of incapacity (believers are able to do so) <sup>(27)</sup>, Al-Sayyid al-Hakim <sup>(28)</sup>, Sheikh Mohammed Yitzhak al-Fayyad <sup>(29)</sup> and Sheikh Bashir al-Najafi <sup>(30)</sup> at Mr. Ali al-Sistani's house to discuss the consequences of the crime(31). Sid Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadr movement, also denounced it and called for unity among Iraqis and three days of mourning



(32). This terrorist crime had serious repercussions on the internal situation, resulting in identity killings in the mixed Iraqi cities of Baghdad, Babylon and Diyala, carried out by armed groups of Shia and Sunni, in which at least 300 Iraqis were killed per month <sup>(33)</sup>, the report of the United Nations Mission in Iraq stated that sectarian actions targeted areas inhabited by Sunni Arabs and Arab citizens residing in Iraq who were accused of supporting terrorists<sup>(34)</sup> Table 2:

**Table No. (2) shows Iraqi Arab and minority deaths and the number of displaced persons after Samarra's 2006 bombings <sup>(35)</sup>**

Month	dead Iraqi Arabs	minorities killed		Number of displaced
		Iraqis	Arab residents	
February	249		34	150 Christian Families
March-April	2299	4		14,842 of them 900 Shia families, 400 Christian families, 370 Sunni families
May - June	14338	41	4	150,000, including 3,140 Shabak families and 400 Kurdish families
July-August	6599			200,000 Iraqis, of whom 50,000 immigrated to Kurdistan

The table shows an increase in the death toll from 249 in February to 6,599 in July and August 2006, accompanied by large exodus operations that exceeded the number of killings. In February, 150 Christian families fled Baghdad, rising to 200,000, some of whom fled to Kurdistan in July and August. While the displacement of Shiite families in the Sunni regions, such as Anbar, to the central and southern regions, and vice versa, has become common The displacement rate reached 40%, followed by Diyala governorate 10%, and then Nineveh 8.4%, as these areas were known for their multi-social fabric <sup>(36)</sup>.

This sectarian violence has contributed to creating a demographic change in the nature of these many regions, and has created new regions that are almost devoid of their original inhabitants and confined to one component, for example the capital Baghdad, the side of Rusafa has turned into a Shiite region almost with the exception of Adhamiya, while al-Karkh region has almost turned into a Sunni one <sup>(37)</sup>, and in fact, some clerics and political leaders have contributed to the increase in violence through their political statements in which they attacked their opponents. Adnan al-Dalimi, head of the Iraqi Consensus List, described a demographic change in Baghdad's construction <sup>(38)</sup>, and the matter did not differ with the reports of senior American and British officials who viewed the Iraqi with great pessimism, as General John Abizaid, the head of the US Central Command <sup>(39)</sup> warned In a



congressional hearing in 2006, the risk of Iraq sliding into civil war, and in a report by the director of the Lexington Institute (Lauren Thomson) warned the US government of the dangers Its continued presence in Iraq in the event of continuation of sectarian violence, as the British ambassador to Iraq, William Patey , warned in a secret memorandum addressed to British Prime Minister Tony Blair of the possibility of dividing Iraq ; As a result of the civil war <sup>(40)</sup>.

Not only were some of the positions of Arab countries such as Jordan and Egypt biased in favor of the Sunni component and attacked Shi 'a. For example, King Abdullah II of Jordan stated that Iran wanted to establish (Islamic Republic of Iraq)<sup>(41)</sup> , while Mohammad Hosni Mubarak<sup>(42)</sup> stated that Shi'a did not possess a national sense and tended to Iran<sup>(43)</sup>. This attitude seems to have been the result of these States' feeling that sectarian violence has contributed to Shia supremacy and the tendency of the cuff to them. and those statements seem to reflect the desire of Arab leaders to ensure that Iraq does not fall into Iran's influence, However, these statements underestimated the authenticity and Arabism of the Iraqi people and made their Governments a guardian of the Iraqi people, an approach Iraq has suffered greatly after 2003.

Despite its disadvantages to the Iraqi people, the sectarian violence contributed to the decline in al-Qa 'idah terrorist influence led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's, whose threat in Iraq was officially acknowledged by the United States following the killing of its leader by an airstrike <sup>(44)</sup>. It can be said that the erosion of the organization's influence as a result of its loss of important areas of Iraq, particularly after the imposition of the Al-Mahdi Army <sup>(45)</sup> in the capital Baghdad and its transformation into a controlling force <sup>(46)</sup>, forced the organization to refrain from Sunni areas that were negatively affected by its practices and rebelled against it, losing its influential role and becoming marginal; After the formation of the United States of America Dishes <sup>(47)</sup>.

### **Third Axis/UN Position on Sectarian Violence in Iraq**

The United Nations, in the words of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in an effort to contain sectarian violence, urged Iraqi political and religious leaders to contain the situation and prevent an increase in sectarian tension, and persuaded them to form the Iraqi government as a basic step in addressing the deteriorating security situation, and to activate the Arab League initiative for national reconciliation, but The turbulent political situation prompted the Arab League to postpone it <sup>(48)</sup>, and it fell to the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ashraf Qazi, the task of making contacts with the preparatory committee for the Arab League to re-implement that initiative. What is remarkable about these contacts is that they were not selective, but even included some of those who are considered opponents. The political process <sup>(49)</sup>, and his meetings also with figures with popular influence, where he met Sayyid Ali al-Sistani on April 19 2006, and discussed with him ways to calm the Iraqi street and form the Iraqi government. He also met Sayyid Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim and Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr and discussed with them the current political and security developments <sup>(50)</sup> . It seems that the United Nations was aware that the keys to the solution are in the hands of the Shiite clergy, so it tried to take advantage of that to put pressure on the Shiite political leaders to show flexibility in their positions in order to speed up their formation.



The United Nations paid great attention to the aforementioned Arab League initiative, so the UN representative, Ashraf Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, intensified his contacts with the Preparatory Committee and with the Iraqi government headed by Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, to reactivate it again <sup>(51)</sup>. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Ibrahim Gambari, and the UN representative, Ashraf Qazi, participated in a meeting The Arab Summit, on the special recommendation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, who identified the participation of the United Nations to achieve two issues: integrating Iraq into the Arab world more broadly, and activating the National Reconciliation Initiative of 2005 <sup>(52)</sup>.

The Arab Summit meeting held between (28-29 March) 2006 in Khartoum confirmed in its closing statement the condemnation of the bombing of the shrine of the two imams, mosques and other places of worship, and support for the initiative of national reconciliation of the Arab League <sup>(53)</sup>. The Arab League mission headed by Mukhtar Lamani visited Baghdad on April 19, 2006, and met with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and opened an office in Iraq <sup>(54)</sup>.

In fact, the efforts of the United Nations internally and externally forced the Iraqi political parties, after months of intense political differences, to sit down to negotiate and resolve the crisis of forming the government by replacing Al-Jaafari with Nuri al-Maliki as president (55), so the latter formed his government on May 20, 2006, and the United Nations welcomed this achievement in a presidential statement issued on behalf of the UN Security Council on the same day and urged the Iraqi government to achieve national reconciliation (56), by involving all Iraqis, laying down their arms and participating in the political process (57). It seems that the UN Security Council has defined the tasks of the Iraqi government to achieve national reconciliation, and made it a priority in the tasks of the government of Nuri al-Maliki, and this is what made the latter publicly adopt this project, as Nuri al-Maliki launched the National Reconciliation Initiative on June 25, 2006 consisting of 24 articles, the most important of which is the declaration of a conditional amnesty, and the release of detainees, and the provision of assistance to areas exposed to violence, and the solution to the problem of militias(58) ,Opening a dialogue with forces that are not affiliated with the political process, activating the Arab League initiative in coordination with the United Nations, and adopting various mechanisms, the most important of which is the formation of a supreme body under the name ((The National Commission for the National Reconciliation and National Dialogue Project)) from representatives of the three authorities and the Ministry of State for National Dialogue Affairs (59), The winning lists in Parliament, representatives of independent personalities, clans and religious references, the formation of sub-committees for national reconciliation in the provinces, and the holding of conferences for various social segments of religious, clan and others, in order to prohibit the shedding of Iraqi blood and encourage national reconciliation, and the initiative received a great response from political figures An Iraqi, where Adnan al-Dulaimi considered the initiative an opportunity for the militants to engage in the political process, and Azza al-Shabandar (a member of the Iraqi List) described it as a first step to correct the mistakes of the past While Bahaa Al-Araji rejected it for the Sadrist movement and demanded that the reconciliation be limited to the parliament due to the inappropriate political conditions in terms of security., and opposed dialogue with the militants being Participating in the killing of the Iraqi people <sup>(60)</sup>, and the



representative of the United Nations in Iraq, Ashraf Qazi, welcomed it and considered it a step towards achieving dialogue and peace among Iraqis. He also reaffirmed the commitment of the United Nations to assist Iraq in implementing its commitments to achieve national reconciliation <sup>(61)</sup>.

Iraq's neighboring countries showed responsiveness towards the Iraqi government's national reconciliation project, so they held a ministerial conference in Iran during the period (8-9 July) 2006, and it was attended by the foreign ministers of Jordan, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and the representative of the United Nations. In Iraq, the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the conference confirmed in its closing statement its support for Nuri al-Maliki's initiative for national reconciliation, and they rejected the acts of violence in Iraq that were taking place in Iraq (62), so the Conference of Neighboring Countries in Tehran was the gateway to the National Accord Conference Which was set up by the Preparatory Committee of the Arab League in Cairo during the period (25-27 July) 2006, which was attended by the representative of the United Nations at the invitation of the Arab League, and its final statement stressed the need for a real and comprehensive reconciliation in Iraq, and put an end to the security, sectarian and national deterioration in Iraq, And reviewing the Iraqi constitution, especially the controversial articles that represented a threat to national unity, and launching a campaign to rebuild mosques, hussainiyas, and the rest of the places of worship for minorities, and preventing religious platforms from exploiting antiquities On August 1, 2006, the Preparatory Committee sent a copy of its statement to the UN Security Council to be an international document<sup>(63)</sup>.

It can be said that the United Nations, through its initiative to contain sectarian violence in Iraq, was insisting on linking the solution to the neighbouring countries, especially the Arab ones. They are trying to marginalize them with the help of their ally, Iran (64), and this created a state of political estrangement between the ruling political system in Iraq and its regional surroundings. This fact was indicated by Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari in a statement to him that the Arab regional environment would not have preferred to help Iraq, but rather was satisfied with ((anticipation and waiting for what happens In Iraq)) <sup>(65)</sup>, and therefore the United Nations focused its efforts on the regional environment and trying to find common ground and contact between the Iraqi political system and the Arab environment and redraw the negative image of Iraq, but the problem in Iraq was that the political differences between the Iraqi leaders are great, as Massoud Barzani announced On September 1, 2006, the opposition raised the flag of Iraq in the region and replaced it With the knowledge of Iraq in 1958, this generated an internal political crisis for the Iraqi government <sup>(66)</sup>. It seems that this crisis was deliberate, as it came after the start of consultations to amend the constitution based on the recommendations of the National Accord Conference. The contentious issues were the essence, which affected the gains of the Kurds, which they obtained in the constitution, and therefore The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, hastened to call the parliament to postpone it for a whole year and to focus on national reconciliation efforts <sup>(67)</sup>.

In continuation of the national reconciliation initiatives, a conference was held in Mecca on October 20, 2006 for Iraqi Shiite and Sunni Muslim clerics under the auspices of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Islamic Supreme Council and others, while none



of the references of Najaf banned it, and contented themselves with supporting the initiative, and confirmed in its closing statement that it focused on the sanctity of Iraqi blood, and that the Muslim who witnessed the two testimonies includes Shiites and Sunnis and rejected the fatwas of takfir, and the sanctity of places of worship, whether they are mosques or Husseiniyas and others From places of worship <sup>(68)</sup>, And despite the intensification of regional initiatives and the efforts of the Iraqi government to hold reconciliation conferences in Iraq, as happened in the National Reconciliation Conference on October 28, 2006 under the auspices of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and the participation of a number of Iraqi ministers and political figures who emphasized the expansion of participation the political forces of all the national forces in the government, disbanding the militias, laying down their arms, and unifying the political discourse, but these internal and external conferences did not come to fruition. Its fruits continued, so the political differences continued, and sectarian violence continued with it (69), and some political forces changed their positions in support of the government, as the Iraqi Accordance List threatened to withdraw from the Iraqi government on the eighth of November 2006, accusing the prime minister of being the only one in making the political decision (70), The weak capacity of the Iraqi military and security establishment contributed to the deterioration of the security situation and the continuation of sectarian violence, as 202 people were killed and dozens injured in one month in Sadr City, as a result of terrorist car and mortar bombings (71).

In the light of the foregoing, the results of the reconciliation efforts were limited <sup>(72)</sup>, so it was necessary to address the root of the sectarian problem through the reconstruction of the shrine of the Two Askari Imams (pbuh), which the United Nations representative, Ashraf Qazi, considered a very important issue, since the two shrines have symbolism in the hearts of the general Muslims, as It is necessary in order to activate national reconciliation, so the latter hastened to meet with the Iraqi Minister of Planning, Barham Salih And the head of the Shiite endowment office, Saleh al-Haidari, and the head of the Sunni endowment office, Ahmed Abdul Ghafour al-Samarrai, and representatives of UNESCO, the European Union, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, Canada, Italy, Britain, the United States of America, Turkey, and the World Bank, to discuss ways of their lives, with the support of the Development Fund for Iraq, and with technical assistance from UNESCO <sup>(73)</sup>, The Minister of Construction and Housing, Muhammad Jassem Jaafar, formed two committees, the first to supervise the process of maintaining the monuments of the two Al-Askari shrines (p), and the second committee to assess the extent of damage resulting from the destruction of the shrine of the Imams Al-Askari (p), and the latter mentioned in his press conference that the process of their reconstruction will be carried out within five years in five stages, provided that stable security conditions are available, in coordination with UNESCO <sup>(74)</sup>. UNESCO signed an agreement with Iraq on June 26, 2007 <sup>(75)</sup> marking the start of the process of rebuilding Al-Askari shrines imams (PBUH). UNESCO identified the first phase as a period of 10 months, with a budget estimated at (b). (8.4) million dollars, the Deposit Fund for Iraq of the United Nations Development Group contributed with an amount of (5.4) million dollars for this task, while the Iraqi government contributed with an amount of (3) million N dollars <sup>(76)</sup>.

The Turkish company (Yukilim) was assigned the task of reconstructing the two the Al-Askari shrines (PBUH) commissioned by UNESCO and the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi government formed three regiments to protect the area from terrorist threats and to facilitate



the work of the executing company <sup>(77)</sup>, and due to the delay of the work of the Turkish company and its failure to make any progress in the work Its contract was terminated, and the ((Technical Committee for the Reconstruction of the Honorable Military Kindergarten)) consisting of the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, the Ministry of Housing and Construction, the Shiite Endowment Office, the Sunni Endowment Office, took over on April 9, 2008, which completed its first stages on March 30, 2009, when it was completed The main construction of the two shrines of the two minarets and the dome and its appurtenances was carried out by Iraqi engineering cadres only as a first stage <sup>(78)</sup>, while the gilding and wrapping operations were completed as a second stage <sup>(79)</sup>. The process of restoring the shrines in its two stages cost about (200) million dollars <sup>(80)</sup>. It seems that the turbulent political situation cannot be separated On the economic situation in Iraq, as the Iraqi government was obligated to pay the international compensation imposed on it.

### **Conclusion**

It turned out that the occupation of Iraq in 2003 was the main reason for preparing the appropriate ground for the occurrence of sectarian violence in Iraq, through the security chaos that they created, and the emergence of terrorist and armed groups in Iraq, which filled this void with their extremist ideas and took control of many Iraqi cities, so the bombing of the shrine of the Imams Al-Askari were the result inevitably to control.

It also appeared that the United Nations found sectarian violence a threat to its political projects based on creating democratic rule in Iraq through parliamentary elections and the drafting of the permanent constitution in 2005. Therefore, the United Nations, through the Secretary-General and its mission in Iraq, made unremitting efforts to establish a national dialogue between Iraqi leaders in various Their religious, clan, ethnic, and partisan political orientations, pressure on Iraqi political parties to find a national government based on national partnership among Iraqis, reject exclusion and political marginalization, and put forward initiatives for national dialogue, the most important of which was the national reconciliation initiative in 2006, which came under strong pressure from the UN Security Council, and these efforts contributed In reducing sectarian violence and combating the proliferation of weapons in Iraqi cities.

The researcher found that the United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) has faced great obstacles in its work in Iraq, the most important of which is sectarian violence. And the difficulty of dealing with the Iraqi political leaders, and the security chaos caused by the occupying power after dissolving the Iraqi army without any alternative. Despite these difficulties, the United Nations was able to deal with sectarian violence in a sophisticated manner without being a party to it, and persuaded all Iraqi parties to arbitrate the language of reason and prevent inflaming the Iraqi street, and push Iraq's neighboring countries to contribute to reducing sectarian violence in Iraq, In addition to its efforts to persuade member states In the Security Council, with its ability to address and resolve the Iraqi crisis by diplomatic means, away from the use of force, which contributed to increasing the confidence of the international community in it and giving it greater powers and tasks commensurate with its achievements.



### **List of margins and sources**

1. Ali bin Muhammad al-Hadi: is the tenth imam in the twelve listing order of the Shia born in Medina in 214 AH corresponding to 828 AD, 254 Hijri died corresponding to 868, and the Qabeh (Pure, Mortal, Najib, and her famous Hadi), the fear of Governor El Abbasi (Al Mu 'taz) From the growing popularity of the imam, he was killed by poison in 254 AH corresponding to 868 AD and buried in Samarra for more details seen: Mohammed bin Ya 'qub al-Kallini, origins from Kafi, J1, T3, Islamic Books House, Dr. M., 1388 A.H., p. 497-503, Modern Committee of the Baqer Institute of Science, Encyclopedia of Testimony of the Infallible, J3, p. 1, Baqer Institute of Science, d. M, 1380H, PO 308-330.
2. 2. Al-Hassan Ben Ali Al-Shari 'i: is the 11th front in the twelve Lid ranking of the Shia Born in Medina in 232 AH corresponding to 846 A.D. The father of Imam al-Mahdi, who moved with his father Imam Ali al-Hadi to Samaria under al-Mutawakil al-Abbasi He spent most of his maternity in compulsory residence, poison was poisoned by the Abbasid Ruler approved by God in 260, corresponding to 873 M for more details: Mohammed bin Ya 'qub Al-Kellini, same source, p. 503-514, Department of Religious Affairs, Nuggets of the Life of Imam Al-Hassan Al-Ma' adi, Holy Upper Threshold, 2016, p. 72.
3. U.N.S.C,S\2006\137,op.cit,7March2006.
4. U.N.S.C,S\2006\137,op.cit,7March2006.
5. Iraqi Consensus List: an electoral list formed by the politician Adnan al-Dalimi in 2005, which was intended to represent all Sunni Arab leaders in the parliamentary elections. It included members of the Islamic Party headed by Ayad al-Samurai and the National Dialogue Council chaired by Khalaf al-Alayan, but lost influence after the 2010 elections. Adnan Al-Dalimi, Last Ended Biography and Memories, Al-Ma 'amun Printing and Publishing House, Amman, 2012, p. 190-206.
6. Sattar Jabbar Ali, the Iraqi elections and their impact on stability and development, Journal of International Studies, Issue 54, Center for Strategic and International Studies, University of Baghdad, 2012, p. 110, Omar Abdullah Aftan, The Impact of Change in the International System on the Iraqi Issue 1990-2008, Ph.D. Published, Institute of Arab Research and Studies, Cairo, 2010, p. 198.
7. At the forefront was the issue of Kirkuk and Ibrahim Al-Jaafari's insistence on its Iraqiness: Al-Mada Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (604), February 18, 2006.
8. The US ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, began to participate in the meetings of the political forces to form the government, and demanded that the government be national, non-sectarian, and not include within it militias. See: Al-Mada Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (607), February 21, 2006, Issue (608), February 22, 2006.
9. It is worth mentioning that Michael Schwartz, a senior professor at Har Food University, stated that the dissolution of the head of the occupation authority, Paul Bremer, of the Iraqi army, made the occupation forces lose the best local tool for controlling the security situation in Iraq, and increased the Iraqis' resentment towards them, so the United States of America was forced to increase the number of Its the Al-Askari shrines bases in Iraq are reduced to 14 military bases to address the imbalance of the security situation in Iraq, see: Michael Schwartz,, A war without end, the context of the Iraq war, Arabization: Nasr Muhammad Ali and Sahar Jaafar Al-Kishwan, reviewed by Hassan Nazim, 1st edition, Beirut, 2019, p. 109, Haifa Ahmed Muhammad, The American Strategy and its Impact on the Security and Social



Situation in Iraq, Journal of International Studies, Issue 36, Center for Strategic and International Studies, University of Baghdad, 2008, p. 153.

10. U.N.S.C, S/2006/137, op.cit, 7 March 2006.
11. Al Mada Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (609), February 23, 2006.
12. TNT: a highly explosive chemical substance invented by the American scientist Alfred Nobel in 1867 AD, and the latter regretted that, so he decided to award the Nobel Prize in 1895 AD for five fields, at the forefront of which was a prize for those who make peace. For more see: Youssef Abu Al-Hajjaj, Alfred Nobel and his famous award 1st Edition, The Golden House for Printing and Publishing, DM, 2018, pp. 17-19.
13. Mowaffaq Al-Rubaie: An Iraqi politician born in Al-Shatrah in Dhi Qar Governorate in 1948. He obtained a bachelor's degree in medicine from the University of Baghdad in 1972, and a master's degree from Kings University in Britain in 1979. He belonged to the Islamic Dawa Party in 1966, withdrew from it in 1996, and joined the Iraqi Governing Council. In 2003, he was appointed as an advisor for Iraqi national security in the government of Iyad Allawi. See: Hassan Latif Kazem Al-Zubaidi, Encyclopedia of Iraqi Politics, 2nd Edition, Al-Arif Printing and Publishing Company, Beirut, 2013, p. 609, and the Al-Hurra website at the link: <https://www.alhurra.com/iraq/2019/09/29>.
14. Siham Al-Shujairi, frameworks for the Iraqi press's dealings with the crisis of the shrines of the two Imams Al-Askari, peace be upon them both, in Samarra..., Journal of the Media Researcher, Issue 16, University of Baghdad, 2012, p. 53.
15. Al-Qabas electronic newspaper, on June 29, 2006, at the link: <https://alqabas.com/article/228054>.
16. Baqir Solagh Al-Zubaidi: An Iraqi politician, born in the city of Amarah, Maysan Governorate, in 1946. He obtained a bachelor's degree in civil engineering in 1969. He immigrated outside Iraq in 1980 and joined the Iraqi Mujahideen Movement in the same year. He was also a representative of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution. In Syria and Lebanon in 1988, he founded the magazine (Nidaa Al-Rafidain) in 1990. He was appointed Minister of the Interior in 2005. He was also appointed Minister of Finance during the period (2006-2010). See: Abdul Rahim Obaid Salem Al-Amiri, previous source, p. 50.
17. Baqer Saulagh al-Zubaid, My Experience, 3rd Edition, Center for Research and Strategic Studies, Baghdad, 2021, p. 115.
18. After the explosion of the two military imams, the Shiite endowment protested against the continued management of the Sunni endowment for the two military shrines, despite the issuance of Cabinet Resolution No. 21, Article (2), which made the shrines part of the Shiite endowment administration, but the Sunni endowment opposed that and continued to manage it for more details. See: The Official Iraqi Fact Sheet, No. (4013), December 28, 2005, Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper (London), No. (1427), March 3, 2006.
19. <https://news.un.org/ar/story/2006/02/50252>.
20. U.N.S.C, SC / 8647, Security Council press release on Iraq, February 22, 2006.
21. George William Casey: An American military commander of Japanese descent, he was born in the US city of Sandia in 1948. He obtained a bachelor's degree in public relations from Georgetown University in 1970, and in the same year he joined the army and became a first lieutenant. He also obtained a master's degree in International Relations from the University of Denver, USA, in 1980, and in 1989 he was appointed as an advisor to the Chief of Staff.



Steed, The Iraq War: The Essential Reference Guide, first edition, ABC-CLIO, California 2019, p.42-43.

22. <https://www.radiosawa.com/archive/2006/02/22>.

23. <https://annabaa.org/nbanews/enfejarsamera/011.htm>.

24. 24. Muhammad Akef: He is the former Supreme Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He was born in Dakahlia Governorate in 1928. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1940. He obtained a bachelor's degree in physical education in 1950. He was imprisoned more than once. He was appointed as a consultant to Dar Al-Nadwa Al-Alamiya During the period (1977-191984), he was also elected by the group as its guide during the period (2004-2010), he died in 2017. See: Muhammad Sadiq Ismail, Islamic movements in the Arab world: the Muslim Brotherhood, Shiites, jihadist movements as a model, 1st edition, Al-Manhal , D.M., 2014, pg. 92, the official encyclopedia of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Internet at the link: <https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title>

25. Sayyid Ali Khamenei: He is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran (the highest religious and political position in Iran). He was born in the holy city of Mashhad in 1939. He moved between Najaf, Qom and Mashhad to collect religious sciences. 1974, in addition to his religious activity, he practiced political activities as he joined Mr. Khomeini's revolution against the Shah. He was appointed to several positions, the most important of which was the Ministry of Defense in 1979, and he was appointed as Mr. Khomeini's representative in the Defense Council in 1980. He was subjected to a failed assassination attempt in 1981. He was elected President of the Republic in 1974. Two terms during the period (1981-1989), the Assembly of Experts elected him as Supreme Leader on June 3, 1989. For more details, see: Abdul Majeed Bamjid, The Role of the Supreme Leader in the Political Decision-Making Process in Iran 1989-2015, Unpublished Master's Thesis, National Higher School of Political Science 2016, pp. 40-43.

26. <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2006/2/22>.

27. Hamid Al-Khafaf, Texts Issued by His Eminence Al-Sayyid Al-Sistani on the Iraqi Question, 1st edition, Dar Al-Tourist Al-Arabi, Beirut, 2009, p. 147.

28. Al-Sayyid Muhammad Saeed Al-Hakim: He is one of the holy authorities of Najaf, he was born in the city of Najaf in 1936, his maternal uncle is the religious authority of the Shiite sect, Sayyid Mohsen Al-Hakim (1889 AD-1970 AD), his most prominent teachers are Sayyid Muhammad Ali Al-Hakim (his father), Sayyid Mohsen Al-Hakim, and Sayyid Hussein Al-Hali He authored many jurisprudential publications, the most important of which are: Al-Muhakim fi Usul al-Fiqh, Misbah al-Minhaj, and others. He was arrested during the era of the former Iraqi regime in the years 1983-1991. He died in 2021. For more, see: Hussein Fadel Mohsen al-Hakim, Qabasat from the History and Thought of Sayyid Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim, Magazine Kufa Studies Center, Volume 2, Issue 62, University of Kufa, 2021, Al-Zaman Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (348248), September 4, 2021.

29. Sheikh Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyadh: one of the religious authorities of Najaf, of Afghani origin, was born in the city of Soba of Ghazni in 1930, traveled to Najaf in 1369 AH corresponding to 1949 AD, the most prominent of his teachers are Sayyid Qurban Ali Wahidi, Sayyid Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei and others, and he has many books, the most important of which is A book of lectures on jurisprudence (five parts), and a book of five and



- others. See: Sheikh Hussein Al-Fadhili, *The Shiites in Afghanistan*, presented by: Al-Sayyid Hassan Al-Amin, 1st edition, Dar Al-Safwa, Beirut, 2006, p. 278-279.
30. Sheikh Bashir al-Najafi: He is one of the religious authorities of Najaf. He was born in the Indian city of Jalandhir in 1942. He traveled to Najaf in 1965. His most prominent political positions were his urging the Iraqis to participate in the first elections, and his fatwa obligating voting for the constitution with a yes. See: Hassan Latif Kazem al-Zubaidi, *The previous source*, p. 113.
  31. Imam Shirazi International Institute for Studies, *Al-Nabaa Informatics Network*, Samarra Al-Jarh Al-Nazeed, 1st edition, Dar Al-Uloom, 2008, p. 115.
  32. <https://www.alayyam.info/news/2H3VJEO0-WNXOUJ>.
  33. Prepared by Al-Bayan Center for Studies and Planning, *National Reconciliation in Iraq*, 1st Edition, Al-Bayan Center for Studies and Planning, Baghdad 2016, p. 18.
  34. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, *Human Rights Report*, January 1-February 28, 2006.
  35. The table was prepared by the researcher based on the following reports of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq: The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the same source, January 1-28 February 2006, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, *Human Rights Report*, March 1-30 April 2006, the United Nations Assistance Mission Iraq, *Human Rights Report*, 1 May-30 June 2006, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, *Human Rights Report*, 1 July-30 August 2006.
  36. Jabbar Abd Jabil, Qais Majeed Alloush, *The spatial variation of the phenomenon of internal forced migration in Iraq, except for the Kurdistan region*, *Journal of the College of Basic Education for Educational and Human Sciences*, No. 15, University of Babylon, 2014, p. 417.
  37. Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper (London), Issue (10069), June 23, 2006, Issue (10269), January 9, 2007.
  38. According to: Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper (London), Issue (9995), March 31, 2006, Issue (9997), April 12, 2006, Issue (10096), July 20, 2006, Issue (1011), August 4, 2006, Issue (1013), August 6, 2006.
  39. The US Central Command: It is a military command affiliated with the US Department of Defense, established in 1983. Its headquarters is located at McDowell Air Force Base in Tampa, Florida. North Africa, the Arabian Gulf, the Middle East and South Asia fall under its responsibilities. It has taken the State of Qatar as its forward base: Joseph J. Hobbs, *World Regional Geography*, first edition, Cengage Learning, 2021, p.28.
  40. According to Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper (London), Issue (10118), August 11, 2006.
  41. See: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, *Iran's race for regional supremacy: the strategic implications*.
  42. Muhammad Hosni Mubarak: He is the fourth president of Egypt. He was born in Kafr Moselhi in the Menoufia Governorate in 1928. He obtained a bachelor's degree in aviation sciences in 1950. He was appointed chief of staff and commander of the Egyptian Air Force in 1972. He was appointed president of Egypt during the period ( 1981-2011). He died in 2020. For more, see: Mahmoud Salih Saeed, Fahd Ajaj Mahmoud Majeed, *Iraq's position on the Egyptian revolution in 2011*, *Tikrit University Journal of Humanities*, Volume 29, Issue 10/C2, University of Tikrit, 2022, pp. 304-305.



43. See: Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper (London), Issue (9963), March 9, 2006, Issue (9995), April 10, 2006.
44. The United States of America was killed in an air strike with two F16 missiles, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in his house in the city of Hibb, Diyala Governorate, on June 8, 2006: Al-Mada Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (691), June 11, 2006, Asharq Al-Awsat Newspaper (London), Issue (1014), August 7, 2006 .
45. The Mahdi Army: military forces affiliated with the leader of the Sadrist movement, formed on August 7, 2003. Their purpose was to fight the American occupation, and their numbers were estimated according to international reports to be (15) thousand fighters, and some others (60) thousand fighters, and it seems that this difference is due to the lack of statistics It is accurate because the Mahdi Army has a large popular base, especially in southern and central Iraq, and is considered the origin of all the Shiite armed factions that fought the occupation, such as Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kitab Hezbollah, and others that defected from it. For more details, see: Ali Reza Nader, The role played by Iran in Iraq RAND Corporation, 2015:[https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE151/RAND\\_PE151z1.arabic.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE151/RAND_PE151z1.arabic.pdf).
46. *Ahmed Chalabi* stated in an interview with Al-Fayhaa TV that had it not been for the Mahdi Army in 2006, there would have been no Shiites in Baghdad, while the Americans and the government were unable to provide security for the Iraqi people, on the link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Db0mV4AVd8&ab\\_channe](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Db0mV4AVd8&ab_channe).
47. These awakenings were formed by the Iraqi clans in Anbar, headed by Ahmed Abu Risha, on August 16, 2006, and the United States paid them salaries. See: Michael Schwartz, previous source, p. 354, Ibrahim Al-Samarrai, Iraq, the Arab country that politicians shunned, 1914-2003, first edition, Dar Al-Moataz, Amman, 2015, pg. 512.
48. Participants in the preparatory meeting of the Arab League in November 2005, in the presence of the representative of the United Nations, agreed to hold a conference for national reconciliation in Iraq in February or March 2006 to consider: U.N.S.C, S\2006\137, op.cit, 7 March 2006.
49. The politician Baqir Solagh Al-Zubaidi criticized the methodology of Ashraf Jehangir Qazi in his contacts with people related to Al-Qaeda, such as Abdel Nasser Al-Janabi. See: Baqer Solagh Al-Zubaidi, previous source, p. 113.
50. Al-Sabah Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (814), April 20, 2006.
51. U.N.S.C,S\2006\137,op.cit,7March2006.
52. U.N.S.C,S\2006\360, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004), 2 June 2006.
53. The Arab League, Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level, Regular Session No.: 18, 28-29 March 2006.
54. Al Mada Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (648), April 20, 2006.
55. Nuri al-Maliki: An Iraqi politician and one of the leaders of the Islamic Dawa Party. He was born in al-Hindiya district in Babil Governorate in 1950. He holds a master's degree from Salah al-Din University in the Arabic language. He joined the Dawa Party in the early seventies of the twentieth century, and after the fall of the former Iraqi regime he became president For the Security and Defense Committee in the National Assembly in 2005, and as



head of the Iraqi government in 2006-2014, see: Hassan Latif Kazem Al-Zubaidi, previous source, p. 640.

56. National Reconciliation: It is a strategy or methodology followed by the state to resolve a crisis or conflict that occurs through building good relations between those conflicting parties in order to restore social peace and pursue dialogue, tolerance, amnesty, compensation, and others as tools to achieve this. See: Muhannad Hamid Mahidi, Fouad Jamil Khalaf, National Reconciliation and Social Peace in Post-2003 Iraq, Anbar University Journal of Legal and Political Sciences, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2020, p. 847.
57. U.N.S.C, S/PRST/2006/24, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 24 May 2006.
58. This designation was widely applied to armed Shiite groups, some of which are involved in the state's security apparatus, and the United States of America accused them of standing behind targeting their forces and attacking Sunni Arabs as they claim, most notably the Mahdi Army, the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Hezbollah. See: Ali Reda Nader, previous source, p. 7-11.
59. The Ministry of State for National Dialogue Affairs: It is a ministry formed by the first Al-Maliki government on May 20, 2006. Its mission was to promote and prepare for holding regional and international conferences to achieve national reconciliation in Iraq. Akram Al-Hakim took charge of it. See: Al-Waqa'e' Al-Iraqi Newspaper (official), Issue (4023), June 12, 2006 Al-Asco Organization, Iraq (National Reconciliation): a regional symposium for parliamentarians on sustainable development for the year 2030 in the Arab region., Session No. 2, Arabized version, 8-9 November 2017, at the link: <https://www.unescwa.org/sites/default/files/event/materials/seminar-parliaments-iraq-presentation-ar.pdf>.
60. For more, see: Prepared by Al-Bayan Center for Studies and Planning, previous source, pp. 262-265, Al-Mada Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (702), June 25, 2006, Issue (703), June 26, 2006, Al-Sabah Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (869), June 25, 2006, Issue (870), June 26, 2006.
61. U.N.S.C, S/2006/706, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004), 1 September 2006.
62. Al-Mada Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (714), July 9, 2006, Kuwaiti Al-Qabas Newspaper, Issue (11889), July 9, 2006, Issue (11891), July 11, 2006.
63. For more details, see: U.N.S.C, S/2006/614 Letter dated 1 August 2006 from, the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 4 August 2006.
64. Harith Hassan, The Sectarian Crisis in Iraq: A Legacy of Exclusion, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Beirut, 2014, p. 18.
65. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper (London), Issue (9956), March 2, 2006.
66. Masoud Barzani's argument was that this flag symbolizes the Baath Party. See: Al-Mada Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (759), September 3, 2006.
67. Al-Sabah Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (925), September 2, 2006, <https://www.oic-oci.org>.
68. <https://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2006%2F10%2F20%2F28423>.
69. Prepared by Al-Bayan Center for Studies and Planning, previous source, p. 266.
70. Al-Sabah Newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (973), November 9, 2006.
71. <https://www.france24.com/ar/20160704>.



72. U.N.S.C, S/2006/945, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004), 5 December 2006.
73. The meeting took place on February 27, 2006. See: Al-Sabah newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (777), March 1, 2006, as well as the United Nations news website at the link: <https://news.un.org/ar/story/2006/02/50462>.
74. The press conference took place on February 27, 2006. See: Al-Sabah newspaper (Baghdad), Issue (776) on February 28, 2006.
75. Terrorist groups again targeted the minarets of the two shrines of the Askari shrines (Peace be upon them) on June 13, 2007: Al-Wasat Bahraini Newspaper, Issue (1742), June 13, 2006.
76. U.N. UNESCO, EX35. 185th, Report by the Director-General on the cultural and educational institutions in Iraq, 30 August 2010.
77. <https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2008/1/28>.
78. <https://alkafeel.net/news/index?id=57>.
79. The two military shrines (PBUH) were inaugurated after laying the holy shrine, which took four years to work on in 2017 and under the direct supervision of the office of the Supreme Religious Authority, Mr. sheet metal) imported from Myanmar, 70 kilograms of gold, 4,500 kilograms of silver and 2,500 kilograms of copper. The most skilled specialists in the Iranian city of Shiraz also participated in the manufacture of the shrine and the doors attached to the holy shrine. See the website of the Husseiniya shrine at the link: <https://imamhussain.org/19280>.
80. Engineer Qassem Karim (one of the Iraqi engineering cadres in charge of the reconstruction of the two shrines) stated in a televised interview with Al-Mayadeen channel that the value of their blinds amounted to about 200 million dollars, and 600 kilograms of pure Iraqi gold were used for them. For more see: <https://www.youtube.com/@almayadeentv>.